OBJ 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is
unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men, even
to our enemies, as may be seen in Mt. 5:44. But the word "neighbor" denotes
a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist towards all men. Therefore
it seems that this precept is unfittingly expressed.
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the origin
of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to ourselves,"
whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one's love
for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that which results
from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.
OBJ 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally.
Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his neighbor
as himself.
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 22:39): "The second" commandment
"is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for
it indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason
for loving is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason
why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh
to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for
glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according
to 1 Jn. 4:21, or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, because all
these words express the same affinity.
The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not
mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like
manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely,
that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he loves himself
for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a "holy" love. Secondly,
as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should not give way to
his neighbor in evil, but only in good things, even as he ought to gratify
his will in good things alone, so that his love for his neighbor may be
a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for loving, namely,
that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure,
but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself
well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a "true" love: since
when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not
love his neighbor truly, but loves himself.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two
ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For
it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect,
is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself;
and Thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom
he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore
the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole
state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it
happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which
they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves
according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which
they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these
ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also
himself.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary:
since that which is loved with the love-of-friendship is
loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love-of-concupiscence,
is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as
that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in
another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with
being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which
is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with
which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while
the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is
relative love.
Reply OBJ 1: Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence,
but into love-of-friendship, and love-of-concupiscence. For
a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are
said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Reply OBJ 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a
man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character
of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further
to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful
or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love-of-concupiscence,
loses the character to true friendship.
I-II.27.3: WHETHER LIKENESS IS A CAUSE OF LOVE?
OBJ 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the
same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of
hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the proud there are
always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters
quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves
in another that which he would not be himself: Thus he loves an
actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness
were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another,
that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness
is not a cause of love.
OBJ 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have
it not: Thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches.
But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore
not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
OBJ 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those
who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain their friendship
for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause
of love.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast
loveth its like."
I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love.
But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind
of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for
example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be
alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially
and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has actually: Thus
we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper place is like
another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according
as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is contained,
in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love-of-friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: Thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love-of-concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.
Now it has been stated above (Q26, A4), that in the love-of-concupiscence,
the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he
desires. But a man loves himself more than another: because he is
one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in
the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness
to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining
the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him,
but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel
among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why
"there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one
another in attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply OBJ 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in
himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the
latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which
he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer,
we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which
is becoming to him in respect of his art.
Reply OBJ 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what
he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above.
Reply OBJ 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to its
act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he expects
from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is
constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in
either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say
that although not all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet
they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, in
force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous
man, as being in conformity with his own natural reason.
I-II.28.2: WHETHER MUTUAL INDWELLING IS AN EFFECT OF
LOVE?
I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Phil. 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (1 Cor. 2:10).
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love-of-concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love-of-friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love-of-concupiscence and by the love-of-friendship, but not in the same way. For the love-of-concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love-of-friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, Thus the beloved is in the lover.
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love-of-friendship
can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return
love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.
I-II.28.3: WHETHER ECSTASY IS AN EFFECT OF LOVE?
OBJ 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy
seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss
of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love
does not cause ecstasy.
OBJ 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him.
Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes himself
into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.
OBJ 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above
(A1). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake
himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always loves the beloved
more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an
effect of love.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine
love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through
love." since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv),
every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that
every love causes ecstasy.
I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; Thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; Thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.
The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far,
namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above (A2),
and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The
second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love-of-friendship,
simply; by love-of-concupiscence not simply but in a restricted
sense. because in love-of-concupiscence, the lover is carried
out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied
with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside
himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself,
he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally
within him. On the other hand, in the love-of-friendship, a man's
affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes and does
good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
Reply OBJ 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.
Reply OBJ 2: This argument applies to love-of-concupiscence,
which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.
Reply OBJ 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills
the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will the good
of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he
loves another more than himself.
SECTION TWO: THE NATURAL LAW
I-II.90.2: WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW?
OBJ 2: By the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated
above (Q90, A2). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a
function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for
an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by
his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.
Reply OBJ 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which
is according to nature, as stated above (Q10, A1): for every act of reasoning
is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite
in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect
of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end
must needs be in virtue of the natural law.
I-II.94.2: WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CONTAINS SEVERAL
PRECEPTS, OR ONLY ONE?
OBJ 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts,
but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above (Q92, A2).
If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow
that there are also many natural laws.
OBJ 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But
human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold.
Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account
of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by reason of the
number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating
to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
I answer that, . . .Now a certain order is to be found in those
things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else,
falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in
all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the
same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and
on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text.
9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension
simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension
of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every
agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently
the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of
good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence
this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued,
and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based
upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as
man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something
to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, Hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and Consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.
Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.
Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth.
Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature
of his reason, which nature is proper to him: Thus man has a natural
inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in
this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural
law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom
one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Reply OBJ 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the character
of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.
Reply OBJ 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human
nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they
are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one
first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law
are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation.
I-II.94.3: WHETHER ALL ACTS OF VIRTUE ARE PRESCRIBED
BY THE NATURAL LAW?
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that
"virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the
natural law.
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first,
under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered
in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered
as virtuous, Thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For
it has been stated (A2) that to the natural law belongs everything to which
a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally
to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: Thus
fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul
is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination
to act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently,
considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law:
since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously.
But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in
their proper species, Thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed
by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature
does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have
been found by men to be conducive to well-living.
I-II.94.4: WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS THE SAME IN ALL
MEN?
OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (AA2,3), to the natural law belongs
everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different
men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures,
others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. Therefore
there is not one natural law for all.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law
is common to all nations."
I answer that, As stated above (AA2,3), to the natural law belongs
those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is
proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process
of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative
reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical
reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with
the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper
conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail.
The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters,
about which human actions are concerned: and Consequently, although
there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters
of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then
in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles
and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards
the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common
notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not
the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles:
and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally
known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: Thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge.
But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were,
of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of
cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases
it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just
as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases
on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some
the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition
of nature; Thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary
to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius
Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
Reply OBJ 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers,
so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs
be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for
all men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.
I-II.94.6: WHETHER THE LAW OF NATURE CAN BE ABOLISHED
FROM THE HEART OF MAN?
I answer that, As stated above (AA4,5), there belong to the
natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all;
and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are,
as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to
those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise
be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of
a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the
general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence
or some other passion, as stated above (Q77, A2). But as to the other,
i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the
human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters
errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs
and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices,
as the Apostle states (Rm. i), were not esteemed sinful.
I-II.90.6: WHETHER THERE IS A LAW IN THE FOMES OF SIN?
OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For
Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But the "fomes"
of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the "fomes"
has not the nature of a law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 7:23): "I see another
law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind."
I answer that, As stated above (A2; Q90, A1, ad 1), the law,
as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way
of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination
or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, is called
a law by participation, as stated above (A2; Q90, A1, ad 1). Now those
who are subject to a law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver.
First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes
indeed different subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that
there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; Thus
by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the
latter passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it
were: Thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a
subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.
Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: Thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them."
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes,"
in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so far as
a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination.
But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation
from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God,
man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor,
this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty
following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has
the nature of a law.
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive
to evil. It is not Thus that it has the nature of a law, as stated
above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine law:
it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be condemned
to hard labor for some misdeed.
SECTION THREE: THE DECALOGUE'S MORAL PRECEPTS
The Decalogue is an old-fashion way of referring to the Ten Commandments
I-II.100.1: WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF
THE OLD DIVINE LAW BELONG TO THE NATUAL LAW?
I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial
and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature
to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation
to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are
called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are
discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds
from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical
reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (Q94,
AA2,4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge
of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so
evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve
or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles: while
some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration
of the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully,
but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider
the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed
in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot judge
unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about
matters which concern good morals; and since good morals are those
which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of
human reason must needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it
follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of
nature; but not all in the same way. For there are certain things which
the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges
to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and
"Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law
of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more
careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law
of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the
less wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of
the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to judge of which,
human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the
things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor
the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy
God in vain."
I-II.100.2: WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW ARE
ABOUT ALL THE ACTS OF VIRTUE?
I answer that . . . .It is therefore evident that the Divine
law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet
so that certain matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the
order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept;
while other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue,
come under an admonition of counsel.
I-II.100.3: WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD
LAW ARE REDUCIBLE TO THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE?
OBJ 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law
are reducible to the ten precepts of the Decalogue. For the first and principal
precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Mt. 22:37,39. But these two are
not contained in the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore not all the moral
precepts are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue.
OBJ 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial
precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the Decalogue,
one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day."
Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the
Decalogue.
I answer that, The precepts of the Decalogue differ from the
other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have
given the precepts of the Decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts
to the people through Moses. Wherefore the Decalogue includes those precepts
the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which
with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general
principles: and those also which become known to man immediately through
divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are
not reckoned among the precepts of the Decalogue: viz. first general principles,
for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the
natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one
should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: and again those
which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason;
since the people receive these principles from God, through being
taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in
the precepts of the Decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first
general principles are contained in them, as principles in their proximate
conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained,
conversely, as conclusions in their principles.
Reply OBJ 1: Those two principles are the first general principles
of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through
nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the Decalogue are
referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.
Reply OBJ 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one
respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of
God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am God." In this
respect it is placed among the precepts of the Decalogue: but not as to
the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept.
I-II.100.5: WHETHER THE DECALOGUE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE
ARE SUFFICIENT?
OBJ 1: . . . Since, the decalogue does not include any precepts directing
man in his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations
to God and himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently
enumerated.
OBJ 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought
or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and adultery, the
prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit adultery,
Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the prohibition of the sin of thought,
when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou
shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the same should have been
done in regard to the sins of homicide and false witness.
I answer that, As stated above (A2), just as the precepts of
human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts
of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth
of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in a community,
two things are required: the first is that he behave well to the head of
the community; the other is that he behave well to those who are his fellows
and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that the Divine
law should contain in the first place precepts ordering man in his relations
to God; and in the second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations
to other men who are his neighbors and live with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of all things.
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's neighbor---sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill": sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet."
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds; wherefore
it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the second, to
words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord
thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the sanctification
of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the
heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps. 32: Conc. 1), by the first
commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second,
the Divine truth; by the third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified,
and wherein we rest as in our last end.
Reply OBJ 1: ". . .love of oneself is contained in the love of God
and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself
to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those precepts only
which refer to our neighbor and to God.
Reply OBJ 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth,
in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are
of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to
be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and
falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural
for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired only for the
sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder
and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought,
but only sins of deed.
I-II.100.6: WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE DECALOGUE PRECEPTS
IS PROPER?
I answer that, As stated above (AA3,5, ad 1), the precepts of
the Decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now
it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason,
as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it
is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for
a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely contrary
to reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently
it was necessary for the precepts of the Decalogue, first of all, to direct
man to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus
also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, it
is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander,
and the opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly it is requisite
that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor,
it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more grievous
sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom
he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct
man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that
one which regards his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the
order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more
repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought.
And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one already living
is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child;
and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.
I-II.100.7: WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE
SUITABLY FORMULATED?
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts of the Decalogue are unsuitably
formulated. because the affirmative precepts direct man to acts
of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice.
But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another.
Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the
Decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept.
Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in
some matters, and negative precepts in others.
Reply OBJ 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of
its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the
affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is
not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is white:
because negation extends further than affirmation. And Hence
too, that one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to the negative
precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than
that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is
a primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering
a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if he
has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can
sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as stated in Ethic. viii,
14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one about
the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of the Sabbath
in memory of the Divine favor.
I-II.100.8: WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE
DISPENSABLE?
OBJ 3: Further, among the precepts of the Decalogue is one forbidding
murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept:
for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as
evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the precepts of the
Decalogue are dispensable.
I answer that, As stated above (Q96, A6; Q97, A4), precepts
admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if
the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated.
Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the
common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the
common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by any precepts
which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order
of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver,
and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law
were enacted, such as this---that no man should work for the destruction
of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man
should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation.
But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining
certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of
dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases
would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention
of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth,
it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch
as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account
of some greater utility.
Now the precepts of the Decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct
us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is
God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice
to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that
each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take
the precepts of the Decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the
Decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.
Reply OBJ 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the Decalogue, in
so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense
the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make
it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers
or foes of the common weal to be slain: Hence this is not contrary
to the precept of the Decalogue; and such a killing is no murder as forbidden
by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner
when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose
it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the Decalogue. . . . .
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue, as to the
essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any
determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that
this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this point they
admit of change.
I-II.100.11: WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO DISTINGUISH OTHER
MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW BESIDES THE DECALOGUE?
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q99,
AA3,4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their
institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed
of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the
moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason,
even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there are three
grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need no promulgation;
such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, and others
like these, as stated above (A3), which are, as it were, the ends of the
commandments; wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them.
Some precepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated
man can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because
human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning
them: these are the precepts of the Decalogue. Again, there are some precepts
the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only the wise; these
are moral precepts added to the Decalogue, and given to the people by God
through Moses and Aaron. But since the things that are evident are
the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, these other
moral precepts added to the Decalogue are reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue, as so many corollaries.
SECTION FOUR: CONCERNING POLITICS, WAR, REVOLUTIONS
AND KILLING
II-II.79.1: WHETHER TO DECLINE FROM EVIL AND TO DO
GOOD ARE PARTS OF JUSTICE?
I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of "all virtue" [*Cf. Q58, A5]. . . .On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.
Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of special
justice, because each is required for the perfect act of justice.
For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others,
as shown above (Q58, A2): and it pertains to the same cause to establish
and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person establishes
the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his
due: and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining
from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.
I-II.90.2: WHETHER THE LAW IS ALWAYS SOMETHING DIRECTED
TO THE COMMON GOOD?
I answer that, As stated above (A1), the law belongs to that
which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and
measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself
there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore
to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the
first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical
reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness,
as stated above (Q2, A7; Q3, A1). Consequently the law must needs
regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since
every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since
one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly
the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in
the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body
politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just,
which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the
body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says
in Polit. i, 1.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle
of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to
that thing: Thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause
of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they
have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly
ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual
work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it
regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common
good.
I-II.90.3: WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN IS COMPETENT
TO MAKE LAWS?
I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost
the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good,
belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent
of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to
the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people:
since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end
concerns him to whom the end belongs.
II-II.40.1: WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS SINFUL TO WAGE WAR?
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command
the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual
to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from
the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private
individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime.
And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority,
it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom
or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have
recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances,
when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rm.
13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an
avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so too, it is their
business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal
against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority
(Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of
the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75):
"The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power
to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the
supreme authority."
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a
rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the
avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words
quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud. Caus.
xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are
waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object
of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good."
For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority,
and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention.
Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for
inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless
spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all
these are rightly condemned in war."
II-II.42.1: WHETHER SEDITION IS A SPECIAL SIN DISTINCT
FROM OTHER SINS?
I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in
common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something
in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and
it differs from them in two points. First, because war and
strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be
said to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such aggression.
Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says that "seditions are tumults tending
to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make preparations with the
intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly
speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one
people and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another,
or between few people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition,
in its proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people,
as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore,
since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the
unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.
II-II.42.2: WHETHER SEDITION IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN?
OBJ 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. For
sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the gloss quoted
above (A1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it is sometimes
just and lawful, as stated above (Q40, A1). Much more, therefore, can sedition
be without a mortal sin.
OBJ 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A1,
ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any
sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.
OBJ 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a tyrannical
rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension in the multitude,
if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant, while the rest
strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be sedition without mortal
sin.
I answer that, As stated above (A1, ad 2), sedition is contrary
to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. Now
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the word
people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those
who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common
good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is opposed
is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows manifestly that
sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason
of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the greater
according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good
which is assailed by strife.
Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by them
to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common good,
and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious, even as
neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself,
as stated above (Q41, A1).
Reply OBJ 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common good,
as stated above (Q40, A1). But sedition runs counter to the common good
of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.
Reply OBJ 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without
sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin: and
sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the
multitude, which is a manifest good.
Reply OBJ 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it
is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler,
as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently
there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed
the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer
greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government.
Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since
he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord
over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private
good of the ruler, and to the injury of the multitude.
II-II.64.5: WHETHER SUICIDE IS EVER MORAL?
OBJ 2: Further, it is moral, for one who exercises public authority,
to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes
an evil-doer. Therefore he may morally kill himself.
OBJ 3: Further, it is morally permissible for one to suffer spontaneously
a lesser danger in order to avoid a greater: Thus it is moral for
one to cut off a decayed limb even from oneself, so that one may save the
whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil,
for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill
himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence
it follows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill'refer to the killing of
a man---not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills
himself, kills nothing else than a man."
I answer that, It is altogether immoral to kill oneself, for
three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves
itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being,
and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary
to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love
himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary
to the natural law and to charity.
Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11).
Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject
to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his
own life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins
against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of
a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce
sentence of death and life, according to Dt. 32:39, "I will kill and I
will make to live."
Reply OBJ 2: One who exercises public authority may morally put to death
an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge
of himself. Wherefore it is not moral for one who exercises public authority
to put himself to death for any sin whatever: although he may morally commit
himself to the judgment of others.
Reply OBJ 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore he can morally dispose of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not moral for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser.
In like manner it is immoral to take one's own life on account of one's having committed a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is not moral to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority.
Again it is immoral for a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sin; of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no stain on the body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's, especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance.
Again it is not moral for anyone to take his own life for fear he should
consent to sin, because "evil must not be done that good may come"
(Rm. 3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small
account and an uncertain event, for it is uncertain whether one will at
some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver
man from sin under any temptation whatever.
II-II.64.7: WHETHER IT IS MORAL TO KILL A MAN IN SELF-DEFENSE?
I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q43, A3; FS, Q12, A1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not immoral, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered immoral, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be immoral: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be moral, because according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is moral to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is immoral to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (A3), it is not moral for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.