Notes on Terminology I:
soul—psyche

- for the Greeks, this is what gives organic beings the powers we call “life”
  - for Aristotle (& St. Thomas)
    - it is the form in the form-matter composite that is a particular substance
    - each kind of living thing has its own kind of soul
      - at least: plant, animal & human souls are different
        >> probably oyster souls & squirrel souls are different
        >> do fox squirrels & gray squirrels have different kinds of soul?—Aristotle does not say
  - for Descartes
    - “soul” is just another word for “mind”

Notes on Terminology II:
Mind & Intellect

- mind is what gives sentient beings the powers we call mental states (e.g., consciousness)
  - for Aristotle (& St. Thomas)
    - animal (& human) souls would include minds, but would not be equivalent to minds, since they also include non-mental powers (growth, reproduction, & local motion)
  - for Descartes
    - “mind” is the name for “thinking substances” (in contrast to “matter,” “extended substance”)
- intellect
  - both Aristotle & Descartes distinguish intellectual powers from other mental powers
  - Aristotle distinguishes different kinds of soul
    - some intellectual (in additional to having sense-powers) [human souls]
    - some having sense-powers (but not intellectual powers) [animal souls]
  - Descartes recognizes only one kind of soul or mind
    - it has both intellectual- and sense-powers
      - human beings have both
      - animals don’t have intellectual-powers
        >> so they don’t have souls & consequently don’t have sense-powers either

More on the Human Soul

- What is the human soul like?
  - it must be something immaterial (St. Thomas & Adler)
  - it is subsistent (St. Thomas, Descartes)
    - i.e., it can exist independently of the body
  - it is imperishable (St. Thomas & Descartes)
    - i.e., it does not naturally cease to exist
  - each individual one was created directly by God (St. Thomas & Descartes)

How are soul (or mind) & body related? I

- St. Thomas Aquinas
  - the human soul (like any animal soul) is the form of the body
    - it gives the body the powers that it has (life)
    - it is what makes a living body different from a corpse
  - the human soul (unlike any animal soul) is capable of operating (& therefore of existing) of the body
    - the intellect is not just the power of a bodily organ
- Descartes
  - the human soul is the form of the body
    - this makes Descartes different from Plato
    - but he is also different from Aristotle & St. Thomas
      - “this is not a case of a form-matter composition found elsewhere in nature
        >> his entire philosophy of nature is different from Aristotle’s
      - the soul is not what gives the body any of its powers
        >> soul (or mind) has one set of powers

Adler
How are soul (or mind) & body related? IIa

Adler’s Survey of Possible Views on Mind & Body

- two extreme views
  - Reductive Materialism (Monism)
    - the mind and the body are not even conceptually distinct
    - see Democritus
  - Dualism
    - the mind and the body are existentially distinct
    - see Plato & Descartes
- two moderate views
  - Non-reductive (moderate) Materialism
    - brain activity is necessary and sufficient for mental states
    - see Searle
  - Moderate Immaterialism
    - brain activity is necessary, but not sufficient, for mental states
    - see Aquinas & Adler (probably Aristotle)

### Reductive Materialism

- Thesis—the mind and the body are not even conceptually distinct
- Adler’s argument against reductive materialism
  - If the mind and the body are not even conceptually distinct, then all references to mental events should be avoidable
  - but they are not
  - as can be seen by contrasting the physiologist’s and the experiencer’s description of conscious states
  - So, the mind and the body are conceptually distinct

### Dualism

- Thesis—the mind and the body are existentially distinct
- Adler’s argument against dualism
  - If the mind and the body are existentially distinct, then what happens to the brain should not affect mental phenomena
  - But it does
    - as in sleep, trauma, &c.
  - So, the mind and the body are not existentially distinct
- Comment
  - Explaining how mind & body interact has always been a challenge for dualists
  - but a dualist might just reply that it is a fact that they do, just as two existentially distinct physical things can interact with one another
  - Another objection is that dualism disrupts the unity of the human person
    - If dualism is true, then a person is either a mind with a body or a body with a mind
    - But a person is neither of those
    - So, dualism is not true.

### Moderate (Non-reductive) Materialism

- Thesis—brain activity is necessary and sufficient for mental states
- Adler’s argument against this
  - Concepts have universality
  - Nothing having universality can be embodied in matter
  - So, Concepts cannot be embodied in matter
  - If conceptualization were the activity of a physical organ, then concepts could be embodied in matter.
  - So, conceptualization is not the activity of a physical organ
- If conceptualization is not the activity of a physical organ, then brain activity not sufficient for mental states

### Arguments for Moderate Immaterialism

- Thesis—brain activity is necessary, but not sufficient, for mental states
  - it is necessary and sufficient for some kinds of mental states
  - but not sufficient for others (not conceptualization)
- Adler’s argument for
  - as above, adding
    - Any activity that is not the activity of a physical organ, is the activity of something that has an immaterial component
    - So, conceptualization is the activity of something that has an immaterial component
Descartes on Immortality

- (1) All created substances are incorruptible
  - Aristotle and Aquinas would reject this principle
  - for them, individual squirrels, &c. are substances and they are obviously corruptible
  - to accept this principle Descartes must reject the substantial unity of animals
    - they have only an accidental (perhaps, mechanical) unity
- (2) Matter is a substance
  - this mean matter taken as a whole, not any particular material thing (e.g., a squirrel or a human body)
- (3) Matter is incorruptible
  - applications
    - the human body as body is incorruptible
    - but the human body as human body is corruptible
    - configuration of members, together with accidents, can be disrupted
- (4) Each individual human soul is a substance
- (5) Each individual human soul is incorruptible
  - the human soul (or mind) is not a configuration of members, &c.
    - so, no disruption of configuration is possible

St. Thomas Aquinas on Immortality

- First set:
  - The intellect is immaterial
    - by “intellect” St. Thomas means a soul that has intellectual powers
    - It is subsistent
    - by “subsistent” St. Thomas means “capable of independent existence”
    - It is incorruptible
    - by “incorruptible” St. Thomas means “not naturally capable of ceasing to exist”
    - So, this is equivalent to the question of the immortality of the soul
    - It was directly created by God
    - by “created” St. Thomas means “brought into being out of nothing”
- Second set:
  - The soul is not the human person
    - I am not my soul
- Third set:
  - Resurrection
    - It is fitting that the soul be reunited with the body
    - But not with just any body (reincarnation)

Immateriality

- What does St. Thomas mean in saying that the soul is “immaterial”?
  - In some sense, all substantial forms are immaterial
    - since they are forms, not matter
    - that would apply to all animal souls & to the forms of minerals
    - but these do still depend on matter for their existence
      - they are just the powers of a material thing organized in a certain way
      - when the matter is disorganized, the form ceases to exist
  - Human souls are “immaterial” in a different sense
    - Not only is it form, not matter
    - It is not just the power of matter arranged in a particular way
      - so it does not depend (as animal souls do) on matter for its existence

The Intellect as Subsistent (75.2)

(4) Anything that (a) is not a body and (b) has an action for which it uses no bodily organ has an operation per se.
(5) The intellectual principle [mind] is capable of knowing all bodies.
So, (6) Any thing capable of knowing all bodies is a thing that (a) is not a body and (b) has an action for which it uses no bodily organ.
(7) The intellectual principle [mind] is capable of knowing all bodies.
So, (5) …
Contrast

incorruptible = not capable of ceasing to exist

– God could still annihilate it if he wanted to

Contrast

– (C1) the chameleon’s color ceases to exist when the chameleon changes color
– (C2) the chameleon’s color ceases to exist when the chameleon dies
  • after the chameleon dies,
    – it won’t be the chameleon’s color any more, since their won’t be a chameleon to have a color
    – it will be the chameleon-corpse’s color
  • this is perhaps clearer for mental states: a person’s aches & pains cease to exist when the person dies
– (C3) the chameleon’s soul will cease to exist when the chameleon dies
  • if a hawk eats the chameleon, there won’t be a chameleon-shaped body for the chameleon soul to be the form of
– (C4) the chameleon will cease to exist when it dies

Argument for the Incorruptibility of the Intellect

• the human soul is not susceptible to corruption in either of these senses
  – It is not corruptible per accidens
  • (1) No subsistent thing is corruptible per accidens.
  • (2) The human soul is a subsistent thing.
  • So, (3) No human soul is corruptible per accidens.
  – It is not corruptible per se
  • (4) No subsistent form is a thing which can be corrupted per se.
  • since …
    – (5) No things which are inseparable from their own existence are things which can be corrupted per se; and
    – (6) All subsistent forms are things which are inseparable from their own existence.
  • (7) The human soul is a subsistent form.
  • So, (8) The human soul is not a thing which can be corrupted per se.
• final argument:
  – (9) Anything that is not corruptible per se or per accidens is incorruptible.
  – (3 & 8) The human soul is not corruptible per se or per accidens.
  – So, (10) The human soul is incorruptible.

Aquinas on the Personal Survival after Death

• Why immortality of the soul is not enough
  – The soul is not the person
  – So showing that the soul survives death does not show that the person survives death
  – Personal survival requires restoration of body-soul composition
  • Resurrection of the body
    – our soul is reunited with a body that is in some sense our body
    » this is the general resurrection
    – on Plato’s anthropology
    » putting the soul back into a body would be reimprisoning it
    – on Aquinas’
    » it is re-constitution the whole person
  • Not “reincarnation” (metempsychosis)
    – especially not “coming back” as an animal
    – not even coming back as “another” person

Four Kinds of Corruption I

• incorruptible = not capable of ceasing to exist
  – the thesis is that there is no natural way for the soul to cease to exist
  – God could still annihilate it if he wanted to

Four Kinds of Corruption II

• The four kinds (again)
  – (C1) the chameleon’s color ceases to exist when the chameleon changes color
  – (C2) the chameleon’s color ceases to exist when the chameleon dies
  – (C3) the chameleon’s soul will cease to exist when the chameleon dies
  – (C4) chameleon will cease to exist when it dies
• These can be distinguished as follows
  – In C1 & C4, are ordinary cases of one form replacing another (corruption per se)
    • brown replaces green in the underlying substance (a chameleon)
    • hawk replaces chameleon as the substantial form that makes the underlying matter that was once a chameleon now a hawk
  – In C2 & C3, the form ceases to exist because something on which it depended for its existence has ceased to exist (corruption per accidens)
    • a thing’s features can’t continue to exist after the thing has ceased to exist
    • the power of a body cannot exist once the body has ceased to exist
    • in these cases, the form’s existence has been undermined

3. The human soul is not the human person

• argument against identity of soul & person
  – (1) Sensation is a human operation.
  – (2) Sensation does not belong to the soul only.
  – So, (3) Some human operations do not belong to the soul only.
  – Equivalently, (4) The soul (by itself) is something that does not perform all operations of a human person.
  – (5) Nothing that does not perform all operations of a human person is a human person
  – So, (6) The soul (by itself) is not a human person.
  • So the incorruptibility of the intellect does not show full personal survival

Creation

• Definition
  – dictionary definitions
    • the action of bringing into existence out of nothing
    • the action of bringing into existence by divine power
  – philosophically
    • definition—the action of bringing into existence out of nothing
    • consequence of the definition—being brought into existence by divine power
      – because only God can bring something into existence out of nothing
  • The Church’s three doctrines of creation
    – creation of the angels
    – creation of the material world at the beginning of time
    – creation of each human soul at the beginning of the individual’s life
Origin of the Human Soul

• two possibilities for the origin of the human soul
  – production by an act of generation, just as for any other form:
    • argument for this
      – Every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter.
      – The soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition.
      – Therefore, the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.
    • argument against
      – The rational soul does not depend for its existence on corporeal matter,
      – i.e., it is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter
      – Anything that does not depend for its existence on corporeal matter is not educed from the potentiality of matter.
      – So, it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.
    – production by an act of creation

Argument for the Creation of each Human Soul

• the human soul, unlike the souls (or forms) of dogs and trees, is a subsistent form.
• a thing must be made in a way suitable to its mode of existence.
  – Accidents (e.g., a color) cannot properly be said to exist;
    • Properly, accidents are only modifications of things that exist.
  – Non-subsistent forms (e.g., a canine soul) can no more properly be said to exist than can accidents.
    • They emerge with the proper organization of matter
    • The form is, under the proper circumstances educed from (led out of) the matter.
  – Substances (e.g., a dog) can properly be said to exist
    • Existence belongs precisely to them, not to some other thing of which they themselves are merely some kind of modification.
    • Material substances can be made by generation from pre-existing matter.
  – Subsistent forms, like substances (subsistent things), can come into existence.
    • but not from pre-existing matter
      – Proper organization of matter is not sufficient to bring it into being
    • They must be created out of nothing